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Environmental Law· A Study of 
the "Kepone" Case 
Ronald J. Bac1gal * 
Margaret I. Bac1gal • * 
INTRODUCTION 
The effectiveness of cnmmal prosecutions m the environmental 
law area 1s often disparaged. 1 Some commentators suggest that 
corporate behavior is not significantly affected by cnmmal convic 
t1ons because fines that are adequate to deter mdiv1dual pollutors 
often have little impact on multi-million dollar corporations. 2 
Such a contention, however 1s challenged by the history sur 
rounding the prosecution of the Allied Chemical Corporation for 
the pollution caused by the pestmde Kepone. The successful 
prosecution of the Kepone case dramatically altered Allied's cor 
porate behavior had a significant impact on legislative and ad-
mimstrat1ve mspect1on schemes, and led to the establishment of 
an endowment for improvement of the environment. 
Federal Distnct Judge Robert R. Merh1ge, Jr., presided over a 
number of cnmmal cases and Civil smts ansmg from the Kepone 
Professor of Law, University of Richmond 
• • Associate at Williams, Mullins, Chnstlan & Dobbms of Richmond, Virginia 
1. See, e.g., Coffee, "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick"· An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 M1cH. L. REV. 386, 386-87 (1981) (Professor Coffee takes 
issue with the longstanding belief that moderate fines do not deter, while severe penalties 
flow through the corporate shell and fall on the relatively blameless"); Kraakman, Corporate 
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J. 857 864-65 (l 984) ("lucrative 
busmess projects of borderline legality may be worth the wager to the firm even though 
they impose legal nsks on managers"). 
2. The potential madequacy of $500,000 fine 1s illustrated m the followmg 
hypothetical: 
Consider, for example, nsk-neutral corporation presented with an opportunity to 
procure by bribery government contract that will bnng m profit of $50,000. If the 
firm perceives ten percent nsk of conviction, it will assign penalty of $50,000 
discounted or expected value of $5,000. Only penalty m excess of $500,000 will 
certamly deter profit-max1mmng corporation; any lower penalty leaves positive 
net expected gam. 
Note, Cnm1nal Sentences/or Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 73 CALIF L. REV. 443, 
447 (1985). 
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mcident.3 Judge Merhige s handling of the Kepone case and his 
creative use of sentencmg stand as a model for future prosecu-
tlons of envtronmental pollutors. 
THE KEPONE CASE 
The widespread pollution caused by the pestlClde Kepone (pro-
nounced "Key-pone") constituted the largest environmental dis-
aster of the times, resultmg m unparalleled cnmmal v10lations of 
federal anti-pollution laws. Allied Chemical Company and associ-
ated defendants were indicted on almost eleven hundred cnmmal 
charges subJectmg them to maximum fines of thtrty-two million 
dollars and possible impnsonment totalling over three hundred 
years.4 On the civil side, smts were filed allegmg more than two 
hundred million dollars m Kepone related damages. A separate 
class-action smt, brought on behalf of some ten thousand fisher 
men and others m manne-related busmesses, claimed a lusty $8.5 
billion. Adding msult to Injury a group of stockholders sued Al-
lied's Board of Dtrectors, claimmg that the Board had v10lated its 
responsibilities m its handling of the Kepone matter 
Aside from the monetary damage, the despoiling of the envi-
ronment was shockmg. An Environmental Protection Agency 
study found traces of the pestlClde Kepone m fish and shellfish as 
far as sixty-five miles from the Allied Chemical plant.5 Fishmg and 
crabbmg were banned from Richmond, Virgmia to the Chesa-
peake Bay amid speculation that the enttre Bay might be contam-
mated. As Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr would observe: "It is 
fnghtenmg to thmk how close we came to losmg the Bay as one of 
our great natural resources. It is also disheartenmg to view how 
derelict government officials were m allowmg this disaster to un-
fold. "6 The government's neglect was most apparent m the fail-
ure of an atr-pollution momtonng station located some two 
hundred yards from the Kepone plant. The momtormg station 
had collected enough data to mdicate excessive amounts of Ke-
3. Excerpted in this article 1s chapter from forthcoming biography which pays tribute 
to Judge Merh1ge and provides look behind the scenes of his landmark dec1s1on. 
4. See, e.g., Umted States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 420 F Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976). 
5. Brown, Kepone Heanngs, New Law Lmdek, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 9, 1976, at 
Al, col. 7 The EPA study, ISSUed December 16, 1975, was conducted by EPA Health 
Effects Research Laboratory. 
6. Interview with the Honorable Robert R. Merh1ge, Jr., U. S. Distnct Court Eastern 
Distnct ofVirgima, in Richmond, Virgima Ouly 16, 1986) [hereinafter Merh1ge interview]. 
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pone were m the ambient air· however the collected air samples 
were not analyzed until after the plant closed. Despite the many 
environmental laws passed m the 1960s and 1970s, state and fed-
eral authont1es did not take action until 1t was too late-too late 
for the James River and its aquatic life which became contami-
nated with Kepone, too late for many fishermen and watermen 
who lost their livelihoods when the state banned the takmg of fish 
and crabs from the James River and too late for company em-
ployees who became senously ill when exposed to Kepone 
p01sonmg. 
The roots of this tragedy date back to 1951 when Allied Chemi-
cal obtamed its first patent to manufacture Kepone as a commer 
c1al pestmde. Kepone is a chlonnated hydrocarbon similar to 
DDT but with a distmct1ve molecular structure which made as-
sessment of its nature more difficult. A small percentage of Ke-
pone was used m this country as ant and roach bait, while most of 
it was shipped overseas as an agncultural pesticide. The federal 
Environmental Protection Agency had little familianty with the 
environmental effects of Kepone because the pesticide was used 
mamly agamst the Colorado potato beetle m Europe, and m Latin 
Amencan countnes to control the banana root bore. 
Kepone was m1t1ally produced from 1966 until 1973 by an Al-
lied Chemical plant m Hopewell, Virgm1a, a blue collar town that 
called itself "the Chemical Capital of the South." However mas-
sive quantities of Kepone and the resultmg widespread contami-
nation were not produced until 1974 when Allied relinqmshed 
the manufacture of Kepone to a small company named Life Sci-
ence Products, Inc. The Life Science company was born when 
Allied decided to convert its Hopewell plant to plastic production 
and consequently sought to spm off the manufactunng of Kepone 
to a smaller company exclusively devoted to production of the 
pesticide. 
Two Allied employees, William P Moore, Jr., research director 
at the Allied Hopewell plant, and production supervisor Virgil A. 
Hundtofte, used their home and life msurance policies to secure a 
$175,000 loan and launch their venture as Life Science Products, 
Inc. 7 They immediately set up operation m a converted gas sta-
uon w1thm the shadow of Allied's Hopewell plant. Although Life 
7 Eisman, Allied Tnal Offered Scenano of Kepone Pollution, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 
4, 1976, at Bl, col. 5. 
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Science was charted as an mdependent corporation, it had a con-
tractual commitment from Allied to finance mstallat1on of pro-
duction eqmpment, supply raw matenals, purchase the entire 
output of Kepone, and buy out Life Science, Inc. if the company 
was unable to contmue operations. This contractual entangle-
ment between Allied and Life Science presented one of the legal 
issues whtch Merh1ge had to resolve at the subsequent cnmmal 
tnal. The prosecution argued that Life Science was a mere mstru-
mentality of the Allied Chemical Corporat10n, thus makmg Allied 
legally responsible for all actions of Life Science, Inc.8 
Life Science began the manufacture of Kepone m February 
l 974, and withm a month senous problems developed. William 
R. Havens, supervisor of the Hopewell sewage treatment plant 
returned from a month s vacation to find the plant s digester m-
operable. He noticed that "somethmg that smelled odd was kill-
mg the bactena the digester normally uses to break down waste 
matenals."9 Havens traced the smell back to the tmy Life Science 
plant, then took his problem to the city manager and city engi-
neer Havens never learned what action they took, but the odd-
smelling chemical kept flowmg through his plant and mto Bailey's 
Creek and the James River 
By the fall of 1974 the State Water Control Board became 
aware of the problem at the Hopewell plant. A young mvest1ga-
tor John Blair Reeves, was sent to meet with Life Science offioals, 
who ms1sted that Kepone could be successfully filtered out of the 
plants waste water Reeves remamed skepttcal and recom-
mended to the Water Control Board that Life Soence be limited 
to Kepone discharges of one hundred parts per billion m its waste 
water The Board directed Reeves to pressure Life Science mto 
acceptmg this standard. However Reeves authonty was under 
cut by the Board's concession that legal action could be taken 
agamst the city of Hopewell, but not agamst the Life Science 
plant. Reeves acknowledged that he was caught m the middle-
"! got different advice from different lawyers," and he "sort of 
harassed" Moore and Hundtofte. 10 But the discharge of Kepone 
contmued. The hassling and negot1atmg with Life Science con-
tmued nght up to the plants closmg mJuly 1975. 
8. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
9. Eisman, supra note 7 at Bl. col. 2. 
10. Id. at Bl, col. 4. 
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Throughout its existence, Life Science rarely met the Board's 
suggested standard of a discharge of about a pound of Kepone a 
day Even when Life Science sought to comply with the em1ss1on 
standard, faulty supervlSlon resulted m frequent leaks, boil-overs, 
and other problems. On several occasions a full tank of Kepone 
had to be flushed, resultmg m the discharge of a thousand 
pounds of the chemical at one time. 11 (The allowed discharge 
level was only about enough to cover a fingertip.) 12 Such dis-
charges were eqmvalent to a chemical version of the atomic 
bomb, for commercial Kepone 1s diluted to 0.125% strength, 
while the Kepone discharged from the plant was 88 to 94% 
pure. 13 The excessive discharges were well known to city and 
state officials, but no strong steps were ever taken to prevent 
them. State, city and plant offioals met m March, 197 5 and raised 
the possibility of suspending plant operat10ns until new pollution 
eqmpment could be mstalled. 14 There was no follow-through, 
however because Life Science owner Moore allegedly made 
veiled threats that once closed, the plant would never reopen. 
The threat to depnve Hopewell of a thnvmg busmess struck 
home to a city that had sought to attract mdustry by advert1smg 
its many local streams and rivers as "natural sewers" for mdus-
tnal waste. Rather than depnve the city and state of a thnvmg 
busmess, the parties agreed to keep the plant runmng, while m-
creasmg efforts to meet the suggested em1ss1on standards. Even 
after this compromise, Life Science contmued to exceed the 
standards. 
H. D Howard, general manager of the Life Science plant, con-
tmued to allow excessive amounts of Kepone to flow mto the city 
sewer on the assumption that there was "a tacit agreement" with 
the city and state to contmue dumpmg as long as timely notice 
was given. Howard contacted the city sewage plant before each 
discharge and mamtamed that "he would never have allowed any 
discharge if the city had told him to stop it." 15 Sewage plant su-
pervisor William R. Havens confirmed that he received such calls 
which dutifully reported the gallons of waste and the amount of 
II. Id. at Bl, col. 6. 
12. Eisman, Hundhofte Contradicts Self on Shipments From Allied, Richmond Times·Dispatch, 
Sept. 29, 1976, at Al, col. 6. 
13. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 27 1976, at B4, col. I. 
14. Eisman, supra note 7 at B4, col. 6. 
15. Id. 
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Kepone they contamed. Havens never told the plant not to make 
a discharge, because "I had no nght to refuse them that I knew 
of."i 6 When this scenano was reconstructed at tnal, Merh1ge an-
grily declared: "It seems that everyone was s1ttmg around on 
their couches. It sounds like a bunch of politics, everybody bemg 
mce to everybody else."i7 
The parties "bemg mce to each other" soon mcluded Allied 
Chemical officials. Life Science mformed Allied of the problems 
m controlling waste discharge, and officials of the two compames 
met m Hopewell onjuly 7 1975.18 At the meetmg Allied agreed 
to look mto procunng additional pollution control eqmpment, 
but Allied contmued to supply raw matenals with knowledge of 
the ex1stmg pollution problem. By allowmg Life Science to con-
tmue operations, Allied subjected itself to government charges 
that 1t had JOmed an ongomg conspiracy to pollute the 
environment. 
When government and corporate officials failed to take strong 
action to control Kepone em1ss10ns, matters were brought to a 
head by employees of Life Science who were exposed to the pest1-
c1de on a daily basis. Kepone was made by combmmg five chemi-
cals m a steel vessel and then puttmg the end product m a dryer 
to elimmate moisture. A thm film of this dned Kepone powder 
could be found throughout the plant. Raw matenals and fimshed 
products were left lymg on the floor makmg the Life Science 
plant a filthy place to work. 19 Employees exposed to this contami-
nated work place began to display physical symptoms: loss of 
equilibnum, memory and coordinauon; slurred speech; heanng 
difficulties; mental disorders; twitchmg eyes and hands; loss of 
body weight; impaired liver functions; and temporary sterility 20 
All of these conditions are now known to be the effects of Kepone 
po1somng. At the time, however Moore assured the workers that 
16. Id. 
17 Eisman, Allied Tnal Offered Scenano of Kepone Pollution, Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
Oct. 4, 1976, at Bl, col. l; see Jones, Allied Motions Re;ected, judge Cnt1cal of Firms Role, Rich-
mond News Leader, Sept. 30, 1976, Al, col. 3. 
18. Eisman, supra note 7 at B4, col. 6. 
19. Gordon, Kepone: Chermcal Remains Fact of Life for its Makers and Watermen, Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at DI, col. 3. 
20. Brown, Kepone Plaintiffs File Request, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 31, 1975, at Bl, 
col. 3; Orndoff, Test Methods in Kepone Case are Complex, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 11, 
1976, at CI, col. I; see mterv1ew with Joseph M. Spivey, III, pnvate counsel, Hunton, Wil-
liams, Gay, and Gibson, m Richmond, Virgm1a (Aug. 12, 1986) [heremafter Spivey 
interview]. 
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Kepone could cause no harm to human bemgs. Both Moore and 
local physmans suggested that the employees' symptoms were 
caused by the stress of workmg sixteen hour shifts at the plant. 
Interestmgly enough, the only correct medical diagnosis was 
offered by a local vetennanan who treated a cat that developed 
shakes after sleepmg on the work clothes of a Life Science worker 
Upon discovenng that Kepone was a pest1c1de, the vetennanan 
advised the owner to keep the cat away from the Kepone and the 
shakes will ·~ust go away " 21 The cat did recover but twenty-
e1ght former employees and one spouse were eventually hosp1tal-
1zed. 22 The human tragedy of Kepone pmsonmg began to unfold 
with the solitary v1s1t to a local physman by Dale F Gilbert, an 
operations supervisor at the Life Science plant. Gilbert's phys1-
c1an sent a blood sample to the Umted States Center for Disease 
Control, which found highly toxic levels of Kepone m Gilbert s 
blood. Withm a week the state ep1dem1ologist v1s1ted the Life 
Science plant and exammed ten workers. Seven of them dis-
played symptoms similar to Gilbert. The next day under threat 
of a state order to shut down, Life Science agreed to close 
operations. 23 
While the immediate v1cums received medical treatment, the 
Environmental Protection Agency began an mvest1gat1on of the 
scope of the environmental mvas1on ofKepone. The sc1enufic m-
vest1gat1on was hampered by the absence of ex1stmg methods for 
accurately determmmg relauvely small concentrations of Kepone 
m air pollution momtonng filters, m soil, m water m seafood, 
and m other matenals. The greater part of the six month study 
was devoted to developmg, evaluatmg, and validatmg testmg 
methods. Testmg for mmute fractional parts of Kepone, ex-
plamed one of the states laboratory chemists, "is like lookmg for 
a piece of a person m the world's population."24 The tests re 
qmred a great deal of skill, precmon, and expenence, not to men-
uon considerable recheckmg and validation. When accurate tests 
were finally developed, the test results mdicated that the environ-
mental distribution of Kepone extended well beyond Hopewell. 
Toxic levels of the chemical could be found m a wide sampling of 
21. Spivey mterv1ew, supra note 20. 
22. Brown, supra note 5, at A7 col. l. 
23. Gordon, supra note 19, at Dl, col. l. 
24. Orndoff, Test Methods m Kepone Case Are Complex, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. l l, 
1976, at Cl, col. l. 
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soil, air water fish, and shellfish. The day after the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency released its findings, Virgm1a Governor 
Mills E. Godwm closed the James River to all fishmg. 25 
The national publicity surrounding Kepone polluuon also drew 
considerable attention from the federal government. Senate sub-
committee mvest1gat1ons began mJanuary 1976, and a House of 
Representatives committee held a public heanng m the Hopewell 
High School Auditonum.26 The Congressional committees 
sought mformation on how to prevent the recurrence of such a 
disaster and also sought to fix the blame for the ex1stmg situation. 
Representative Dom1mck V Damels, D-NJ., attached the blame 
to the federal Occupauonal Safety and Health Admm1strat1on 
(OSHA), which had failed to take action on a Life Science em-
ployee s complamt filed some ten months before the plant closed. 
Had OSHA acted properly charged Damels, "there 1s a strong 
possibility that the Kepone tragedy may have been averted. "27 
Senator James B. Allen, D-Ala., was particularly disturbed that 
federal regulatory agencies were remiss and that the Kepone mc1-
dent came to light only because state agencies "blew the whistle" 
on the operation.28 President Carter m a Norfolk campaign 
speech, charged Governor Godwm and Virg1ma Senator Harry F 
Byrd, Jr., with "domg nothmg to solve the problem brought 
about by kepone. "29 Godwm fired back: "I think 1t 1s repre-
hensible that any political candidate would try to capitalize on ca-
tastrophe and use human suffermg m order to garner votes."3 0 
While politICal leaders contmued the public debate, pnvate c1t1-
zens bore the day-to-day burden of the Kepone mvest1gat1on. A 
twenty-three member federal grand JUry was impaneled m Rich-
mond and met for four months, hearmg testimony from fifty wit-
nesses and exammmg over five hundred documents.31 On May 8, 
1976, the grandjury handed down 1,094 cnmmal charges agamst 
25. Id. at Cl, col. I. 
26. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 27, 1976, at B4, col. I. 
27 Id. 
28. Brown, Not Expert, HundhojteAsserts, Richmond Times-Dispatch.Jan. 27 1976, at Bl, 
col. 3; Brown, supra note 5, at A7 col. 5. 
29. Robertson & Whitley, Godwin Defends Virginia Kepone Action, Richmond News Leader, 
Sept. 9, 1976, at Al, col. 6. 
30. Id. at Al, col. 6. 
31. Brown, Allied, Hopewell, Others Named zn 1,094 Counts, Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
May 8, 1976, at Al, col. 4. 
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Allied Chemical, Life Science, their officers, and the City of 
Hopewell. 32 
Allied responded to the grand JUry mdictment by leveling its 
own charges agamst the government. In a press release issued 
w1thm hours of the mdictment, Allied contended that "[t]he 
scope of the cnmmal act10ns was unwarranted and unprece-
dented. The extreme reaction shown by the mdictments appears 
to reflect official frustration over the failure of regulatory agencies 
to [do their proper JOb.]"33 Allied soon found itself fightmg 
not only the federal prosecutors, but also an important public re 
lat1ons battle. The grand JUry mdictment consisted of the great-
est number of cnmmal charges ever brought under the federal 
water pollution laws and the sheer magmtude of the numbers cre-
ated national headlines. The CBS show "60 Minutes" ran a 
lengthy story on Kepone featuring an mterv1ew with Life Science 
owner Moore. Before a nat10nw1de audience, Dan Rather con-
fronted Moore with Allied's own "Blue Book" studies which dis-
closed that Kepone was known to cause cancer m laboratory 
ammals. Moore was taken aback because Allied had never re-
vealed those studies to anyone. The "60 Minutes" story left Al-
lied and the City of Hopewell with a black eye, and shortly after 
the story city officials removed the signs that read, "Hopewell: 
Chemical Capital of the South.'' 
Allied mamtamed that the Blue Books were wholly internal 
documents and ms1sted that the adverse publioty and the grand 
JUry mdictment were distortions of the facts. Allied parucularly 
took issue with bemg portrayed as a callous polluter engaged m 
rampant despoiling of the environment. The grand JUry had 
listed each day of discharge of Kepone as a separate charge m the 
mdictment, thus a thousand separate counts of pollution related 
to a smgle pattern of production at one plant. 34 The greatest 
number of charges (940) related to the time penod 1966 to 1974 
when Allied Itself manufactured the pestlClde Kepone. The re-
32. Id. 
33. Charges Denied By Allied, Richmond News Leader, May 8, 1976, at A4, col. 2. 
34. See, e.g., Umted States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 420 F Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976). 
This proliferation of counts may no longer be possible after November 1, 1986, the effec 
tlve date of 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b). The Code places ceiling, twice the maximum fine for 
the most senous offense, on the aggregate of fines court may impose for multiple of-
fenses "that anse from common scheme or plan. This ceiling, however, applies only to 
offenses "that do not cause separable or distmgmshable kmds of harms or damage. It 1s 
questionable whether each additional day toxic em1ss1on causes separate harm. 
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mammg charges related to Allied's role as an aider and abettor 
and co-conspirator with Life Science, Inc. Also Jomed as co-con-
spirators were the City of Hopewell and four corporate officials at 
Allied's plastics and agricultural divmon plants m Hopewell. 
Imually the alleged conspirators presented a umted defense to 
the charges. The umted front, however began to weaken as the 
mdiv1dual defendants sought to strike favorable plea bargams 
with the government. The City of Hopewell pleaded no-contest 
to ten cnmmal counts and paid a $10,000 fine m return for dis-
missal of the remammg charges.35 At later tnals 1t became appar 
ent that Hopewell had been very negligent m allowmg pollut1on 
to contmue. Merh1ge now regrets that he imposed only a $10,000 
fine. "If I knew then what I know now" he reflects, "I would not 
have been so lement."36 Followmg the Hopewell case, the techm-
cal supenntendent of Allied's plastics div1S1on pleaded guilty to 
makmg a false statement concernmg the discharge of Kepone to 
the Environmental Protection Agency and to the Umted States 
Army Corps of Engmeers.37 Soon afterward, the techmcal super 
mtendent of Allied's agricultural div1S1on m Hopewell pied guilty 
to aiding and abettmg the illegal discharge of Kepone.38 In other 
bench tnals, Merh1ge acqmtted a number of low level Allied em-
ployees. He flipantly warned the prosecutors: "I am t conv1ctmg 
the shnooks."39 In a senous vem, he explamed that those em-
ployees were products of a time when pollut1on was not part of 
the social consciousness. Lower level employees, who had never 
even heard of the Clean Water Act, were merely products of a 
time and atmosphere when people simply dumped their garbage 
m local streams. To Merh1ge, the responsibility for disposmg of 
mdustnal waste lay with Allied's corporate hierarchy He would 
not penmt the blame to be shifted to low level employees who 
merely earned out company policy 
Alerted to Merh1ge s reluctance to pumsh lower echelon em-
ployees, the prosecutors focused upon Hundtofte and Moore, the 
co-owners of Life Science. Hundtofte pied guilty to conspiracy to 
35. Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at D2, col. I. 
36. Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6. 
37 Hoyle, Allied Not Contesting 940 U.S. Charges, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 20, 
1976, at Al, col. I; Charges Denied By Allied, supra note 33, at Al, col. 4; Brown, supra note 
31. 
38. Brown, supra note 31, at A I, col. 3. 
39. Interview with tnal paruc1pams; source not for attribution. 
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violate water pollution control laws, and no-contest to seventy-
mne other misdemeanor counts.40 The government accepted 
these pleas m return for Hundtofte s agreement to be a prosecu-
tion witness agamst Allied and the other defendants. Moore 
pleaded no-contest to one hundred and fifty-three pollullon 
charges, but refused a government offer to drop half of the 
charges if he would confess to the conspiracy with Allied.41 
Moore s refusal to admit the conspiracy proved to be a ke): factor 
m Allied's defense strategy 4 2 
Allied m1t1ally sought to have its tnal removed from Merh1ge s 
JUrtsdict1on because the extensive pretnal publicity was said to 
preclude impanelling an unbiased JUry In a related civil suit Mer 
h1ge asked the JUry panel if anyone had heard or read about the 
Kepone "incident." Before he could be stopped, one Juror arose 
and volunteered: "I read about 1t and I thmk that what Allied did 
was JUSt terrible." Merh1ge called counsel to the bench and an-
nounced: "We are on our way to Elkms, West Virgima." Startled 
counsel could only ask: ''Judge, where m God's name is that?" 
Merh1ge laughed: "Thats why we are gomg there." The refer 
ence to Elkms has become a standard line with Merh1ge. When-
ever he suggests to counsel that "we are gomg to Elkms," the 
lawyers know that it means a change of venue for the tnal.43 
In the cnmmal tnal, however Allied ultimately decided to 
waive a Jury and take its chances before Merh1ge sittmg alone as 
the tner of fact. In another surpnse move on August 19, 1976, 
the same day that Hundtofte pied guilty Allied pied no-contest to 
mne hundred forty counts mvolvmg the illegal discharge of Ke-
pone and two other chemicals.44 The dec1s1on to plead no-con-
test was made over the objection of Joseph M. Spivey III, the 
chief coordinator of Allied's defense team. Spivey had employed 
Murray J. Janus, Merh1ge s former law associate, as a cnmmal law 
specialist, and the two men prepared to dispute all of the govern-
ment's charges. As Spivey andJanus discussed their tnal strategy 
they received a phone call from Allied's corporate headquarters 
directmg them to enter the plea immediately Janus particularly 
felt that it was a bad decmon because: "We could have plea bar 
40. Hoyle, supra note 37 at A5, col. 4. 
41. Spivey mterv1ew, supra note 20. 
42. See infra note 60 and accompanymg text. 
43. Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6. 
44. Hoyle, supra note 37 at Al, col. I. 
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gamed and persuaded the government to drop at least half of the 
charges. But we were told to forget the legal maneuvenng. Al-
lied was losmg the public relations battle and wanted to put an 
end to most of the controversy "45 
While denymg any responsibility for the cnmmal charges relat-
mg to the actions of Life Science, Allied reluctantly admitted its 
fault m makmg discharges durmg the early years when Allied it-
self was engaged m the manufacture of Kepone. The Umted 
States Attorney angrily requested that Merh1ge refuse to accept a 
plea of no-contest46 which was eqmvalent to a guilty plea for pur 
poses of the cnmmal tnal, but could not be used as an adm1ss1on 
of fault m pending CIVil suits. Simultaneously with the cnmmal 
charges, Allied was facmg civil smts seekmg over two hundred 
million dollars m damages caused by Kepone.47 Allied thus 
sought to avmd any cnmmal adm1ss10n that could harm its pos1-
t1on m the Civil smts. While Allied was concerned with its poten-
tial liability to pnvate claimants, the prosecution was concerned 
with the public s nght to review the details of the Kepone tragedy 
Citmg "a great deal of public concern as well as a great deal of 
public confus10n," the Umted States Attorney ms1sted that "the 
public has the nght to a tnal." The prosecutor was concerned 
that Allied officials "still have not come forward and admitted that 
they have committed a cnme. "48 
Merh1ge accepted the no-contest plea while publicly announc 
mg that he would regard it as the equivalent of a guilty plea. Al-
lied' s plea subjected It to maximum cnmmal fines of $13.24 
million, which Merh1ge regarded as senous enough penalties m-
dependent of the potential Civil damages. Merh1ge also pomted 
out that a public record would be made when Allied subsequently 
faced tnal on the one hundred fifty-seven other pending cnmmal 
charges relatmg to Allied's responsibility for Kepone discharges 
made by Life Science, Inc. 
At Allied's tnal on those charges, the prosecut10n advanced two 
theones to hold Allied responsible for the Kepone em1ss10ns 
45. Interview with Murray J. Janus, pnvate counsel, Brenner, Baber & Janus, m Rich-
mond, Virgm1a (May, 1986) [hereinafter Janus mterv1ew]. 
46. Hoyle, supra note 37 
47 Eisman, Kepone L1t1gatron Growing Rapidly, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 13, 1976, 
at Bl, col. 5. 
48. Jones, Heanngs to Help Fix Allied Fines, Richmond News Leader, Aug. 20, 1976, at A3, 
col. 4-5. 
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made by Life Science. The first theory portrayed Life Science as a 
"mere mstrumentality" of the Allied Corporation. Life Science s 
status as a dependent subsidiary was said to be embodied m a 
contractual agreement that provided for Allied to finance the 
purchase of production equipment, supply raw materials, 
purchase the entire output of Kepone, and buy out Life Science, 
Inc. if the company was unable to operate. Under this arrange 
ment, the prosecution argued that Life Science was merely an-
other divlSlon of the giant Allied ChemICal Corporation. Allied 
was said to hold ultimate authonty over its subsidiaries and thus 
could not escape its corporate responsibility by establishmg the 
facade of mdependent dummy corporations. Legal analogies 
were drawn to Merhige s earlier rulings m the Richmond school 
consolidation case which recogmzed that the State of Virgima 
could not delegate its desegregation responsibilities to political 
subdivlSlons.49 Applymg this theory of ultimate responsibility to 
the corporate sector Allied would not be permitted to delegate 
its pollution control responsibilities to corporate subdivlSlons. 
The Allied defense team countered this argument by maintaining 
that Life Science was at all times a separate and mdependent com-
pany which was not controlled by Allied Chemical. 
At trial, the evidence of Life Science s mdependent status was 
confusing and contradictory Moore testified that Life Science 
was an "independent" company that sought business from other 
sources. 50 In response to questions from Merhige, however 
Moore admitted that the firm s only production work during its 
brief existence involved the manufactunng of Kepone for the Al-
lied Corporation. Moore also described the relationship between 
Allied and Life Science as very close because "all the money we 
got came from Allied."5 i Merhige appeared skeptICal, andjanus 
worned that the defense had lost on the issue of corporate 
independence. 52 
In order to keep the parties guessing and thus more willing to 
negotiate a settlement, Merhige often projects one image during 
tnal, then issues a ruling diametncally opposed to the impression 
he created. This was one of those occasions. Much to the sur 
49. Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, Virgm1a, 338 F Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
50. Jones, Witness Says Allied Alerted, Richmond News Leader, Sepl. 28, 1976, at Al, col. 
3. 
51. Id. at A4, col. 6. 
52. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45. 
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pnse of courtroom observers, Merhige granted the defense mo-
tton to dismiss one hundred forty-four charges that Allied was 
responsible for illegal em1ss1ons made by Life Science, Inc.5 3 Mer 
h1ge likened Allied' s responsibility to that of a prescnpt1on drug 
manufacturer who has a legal duty to warn physicians of the po-
tential dangers of a drug. After that m1t1al warnmg is given, fur 
ther responsibility then rests wnh the physIC1an to warn and 
mform others. Because Allied had notified Life Science of the na-
ture of Kepone, Allied had no further duty to report to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency or any other regulatory body 
Merh1ge concluded that the ultimate fault for the illegal dis-
charges lay with Life Science, thus Allied could not be found 
guilty of cnmmal actions performed by Life Science. 
The dismissal of one hundred and forty-four counts of the m-
dictment left the prosecution with only nme viable cnmmal 
charges. These charges hmged upon a theory of conspiracy be 
tween Life Science and Allied. The government argued that on 
July 7 1975, Allied officials met andJomed with Life Science co-
owners Moore and Hundtofte m an ongomg conspiracy to pollute 
the environment. At the meetmg, Allied officials were mformed 
that pollution standards were not bemg met and could not be met 
without additional pollution control equipment. Allied agreed to 
look mto obtammg the necessary equipment, but did not order 
Life Science to cease production of Kepone. Life Science contm-
ued to make illegal discharges from July 7 until its closmg onjuly 
24, thus, according to the prosecution, Allied knowmgly acqui-
esced m the illegal pollut10n of the James River 54 The defense 
demed that Allied had approved of further illegal discharges, and 
the question of exactly what had happened at the July 7th meetmg 
was presented to Merh1ge. 
The prosecution built Its case on the testimony of Moore and 
Hundtofte, the former partners who were now at odds with each 
other They had struck different plea bargams with the govern-
ment: Hundtofte confessed to the conspiracy charge, while 
Moore ms1sted that no conspiracy had ever existed. They also 
attempted to attribute the major share of the blame to each other 
Hundtofte testified that Moore "was m charge of the quality con-
trol operation,"55 while Moore asserted that Hundtofte "called 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Jones, supra note 50, at A4, col. 4. 
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the shots" m regard to Kepone production.56 With respect to the 
Allied Corporation, Moore and Hundtofte contradicted not only 
each other but also their own earlier statements. 
Testifymg for the government, Hundtofte unhes1tatmgly stated 
that Allied contmued to supply raw matenals after the July 7th 
meetmg. When pressed on cross-exammat1on, Hundtofte admit-
ted that he was not really sure if Allied had supplied any chemi-
cals after July 7 57 Moore was an even less convmcmg witness. 
On direct exammat1on Moore testified that he had contmuously 
mformed Allied of the Life Science plant's failure to meet em1s-
s1on standards. Defense counsel Murray Janus then produced a 
letter Moore wrote m March 1975, m which he reported to Allied 
that Life Science was complymg with federal environmental stan-
dards. When asked about the mcons1stency Moore responded: 
"I've been mterv1ewed by so many lawyers that if I don't tell 
somethmg crossways I thmk I should get a medal. "58 Moore had 
m fact been forced to testify m many proceedings: before the 
Senate, the House of Representatives, the Grand Jury and m a 
number of depositions. Cross-exammat1on was facilitated by Ja-
nus s cross-referencmg of all the previous testimony "If Moore 
mentioned safety goggles," Janus explamed, "I could flip to six 
previous statements on goggles. As often as not he had said six 
different thmgs, all under oath. Cross-exammat1on was a piece of 
cake. " 59 On re-direct exammat1on, Moore agam changed his 
story to an assertion that he was "certam" that no dec1s10ns re-
garding water pollution were made without discussions with Al-
lied officials. Moore, however retreated from this pos1t10n when 
he affirmed that he had refused the government s offer to plea 
bargam to a conspiracy charge because, "I felt on my part there 
certamly was no conspiracy " 60 Dunng another part of his six 
hour testimony Moore conceded that when mformed of the pollu-
tion problem on July 7 Allied never suggested closmg the Life 
Science plant. "Allied mdicated that they needed the product," 
confessed Moore, "and Life Science certamly needed to produce 
it to stay m busmess."61 Faced with such mcons1stenc1es and con-
56. Id. col. 8. 
57 Eisman, supra note 12, at Al, col. 7 
58. Richmond News Leader, Sept. 28, 1976, at A4, col. 8. 
59. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45. 
60. Jones, supra note 17 at AS, col. l. 
61. Id. 
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tradict1ons m the government s case, the defense asked Merh1ge 
to dismiss the conspiracy charges agamst Allied. 
Merh1ge demed the motion because he felt that the govern-
ment had made out a mm1mum pnma facia case that Allied had 
part1Cipated m a conspiracy to v10late water pollution laws. The 
government s case was admittedly weak, but not so weak that 1t 
could be thrown out of court on purely legal grounds. Merh1ge 
was further troubled by the conflictmg testimony and by the legal 
question of who bore the responsibility for ordenng Life Science 
to cease operations. Janus argued that responsibility for enforc 
mg pollut10n control reqmrements lay "where the pipe has the 
water The City of Hopewell and the Environmental Protection 
Agency were responsible for momtonng discharges from the 
plant. Thus the responsibility for closmg the plant should not be 
placed on Allied, which functioned merely as a customer of Life 
Sc1ence."62 Merh1ge took the argument under advisement with 
the comment that: "Your theory Mr Janus, has occurred to the 
court."63 Merh1ge, however did not wish to resolve the legal 
quesuon until he had heard all of the evidence, thus he directed 
Janus to go forward with the defense case. 
Dunng an overmght recess, the Allied defense team debated 
whether to present the defense case or to waive the presentation 
of evidence and stake its chances for acqmttal on the weakness of 
the prosecuuon s case.64 The situation presented a dilemma fa-
miliar to cnmmal defense attorneys. An expenenced defense 
counsel can sometimes discern when the prosecuuon has failed to 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In such mstances 1t is 
shear folly to present defense evidence. Defense witnesses may 
be caught m mconsistenc1es or reveal previously undisclosed evi-
dence. The prosecution can then use the defense witnesses to 
plug gaps m its case and thus prove the cnmmal charge based on 
evidence offered by the defense. On the other hand, the difficulty 
with wa1vmg the presentation of evidence 1s that counsel can 
never be sure if the judge agrees that the prosecuuon has failed to 
prove its case. Absolute certamty m reading a Judge s mmd 1s 
impossible, particularly if the judge 1s Robert R. Merh1ge, Jr To 
waive the presentation of all defense evidence would mean a total 
62. Janus interview, supra note 45. 
63. Id. 
64. Spivey Interview, supra note 21. 
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commitment to gambling on counsel's ability to read Merh1ge s 
current leanmgs. 
The defense team was badly split over the question of wa1vmg 
or presentmg the defense evidence, if any Allied's m-house 
counsel argued to present all of the defense case, while associated 
counsel argued that no evidence should be mtroduced. The 
stalemate was broken late that mght when Allied's president left 
the declSlon to Murray Janus-"We h1red Murray as our crimmal 
law specialist and we ve got to go with his Judgment."65 Janus 
based his declSlon on his ability to read Merh1ge s mmd: "I felt 
that Merh1ge was leanmg toward acqmttal, but I also felt that he 
was lookmg for some help. He needed somethmg more to hang 
his hat on. I decided to hedge our bets by offering JUSt a very 
small part of the defense case. Not enough to give the prosecu-
tion any ammurnt1on to use agamst us, but JUSt enough to tip the 
scales and push Merh1ge toward an acqmttal."66 When the de 
fense opened its case, Janus called only two witnesses. Moore 
took the stand to reaffirm that Allied had expressed a des1re that 
he contmue operations, but he also testified that he did not feel 
that Allied had agreed to illegal discharges of Kepone. Moores 
multiple mcons1stenc1es had eroded his credibility as a witness, 
but the other defense witness offered devastatmg testimony Ja-
nus called to the witness stand an Allied official who attended the 
meetmg with Moore and Hundtofte. The witness admitted that 
he left the July meetmg with the understanding that Life Science 
could not meet discharge reqmrements while operatmg at capac 
1ty However he also understood that the City of Hopewell had 
reqmred Life Science to mstall three 20,000 gallon tanks to store 
Kepone waste prior to discharge. In the mmd of the witness there 
was a clear understanding that the waste would be held m the 
tanks until properly treated. He vehemently asserted that: 
"There was no agreement to knowmgly violate the law " 67 Janus 
thus argued that although Allied might have stopped the illegal 
discharges by refusmg to supply raw materials or by refusmg to 
accept delivery of Kepone, the legal responsibility to stop Life 
Science did not rest with Allied. While Janus conceded that Al-
lied could have done more to stop the pollut1on, he vehemently 
65. Id. 
66. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45. 
67 Id., see also Eisman, Kepone Case Conspiracy Not Proved, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 
1, 1976, at Al, col. 7 
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asserted that mere negligence was not sufficient to establish guilt 
of a cnminal conspiracy 
Faced with this strong demal from Allied, and unable to resolve 
the conflicting testimony of the government witnesses, Merh1ge 
cleared Allied of all responsibility for Life Science s illegal dis-
charges of Kepone. Merh1ge concluded that there was "simply 
not sufficient evidence that Allied knowingly aided and abetted in 
the illegal discharges from the Life Science plant. The evidence 
leaves me with a reasonable doubt and I have no ch01ce but to 
acqmt the defendant Allied Chemical Corporation. "68 Merh1ge 
dutifully followed the constitution in affording Allied its presump-
tion of innocence and its nght to force the prosecution to estab-
lish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Merh1ge steadfastly refused 
to allow the public hystena over Kepone to lead to a tainted con-
viction. The Allied defense team (a considerable group) was es-
tatic over the acqmttal and staged an all-mght celebration at a 
prominent restaurant. The bill for the victory party was rumored 
to be the largest in the history of Richmond. The celebration 
paled, however when Merh1ge subsequently pointed to the pend-
mg sentencmg heanngs on Allied's no contest pleas, and an-
nounced: "When they are convicted they're gomg to know 
they ve been convicted. " 69 
Although the legal maneuvenng m the conspiracy case had 
temporarily overshadowed the human aspect of the Kepone trag-
edy Merh1ge s watchful eye had discerned the plight of the Ke 
pone v1ct1ms. Almost forgotten at the conspiracy tnal was the 
man who had started the Kepone mvest1gation by sending his 
blood sample to the Umted States Center for Disease Control.70 
When Dale Gilbert appeared as a witness, his courtroom de-
meanor was a dramatic reminder of the human suffenng caused 
by Kepone po1sonmg. Gilbert's unsteady walk to the witness 
stand revealed his disturbed equilibnum and his hands shook vio-
lently throughout his testimony The image of this broken man 
may have remained with Merh1ge when he sentenced Allied on 
the nine hundred forty charges to which Allied had earlier 
pleaded no-contest. 
Merh1ge also heard disturbmg accounts of Life Science s failure 
to protect its employees. A Life Science worker recalled that: 
68. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45. 
69. Eisman, supra note 67 at AIO, col. 4. 
70. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
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"Nobody ever said this stuff was dangerous. I was told 1t was not 
harmful and you could eat the stuff and it's not gomg to hurt 
you."71 The state ep1dem1ologist described the employees work-
ing conditions m the Life Science plant as incredibly lax and 
sloppy The Life Science plant was hot, steamy and covered with 
Kepone dust. The workers got the dust over their clothes and 
bodies, they mhaled 1t, and ate their lunches m 1t. When they 
went home, the Kepone contammated their houses. The threat to 
the workers families became apparent when Gilbert's wife was 
hospitalized for liver problems brought on by prolonged expo-
sure to the Kepone dust brought mto her home.72 At one pomt m 
a related civil tnal, Allied asked Merh1ge to order the workers to 
Duke Umvers1ty Hospital for tests, mcluding surgery to deter 
mme the extent of their InJUry Merh1ge would not allow such 
"invasive surgery " but the workers were mcensed that Allied had 
made such a request. 73 The workers were also bitter that Moore 
and Hundtofte had offered repeated assurances that the Kepone 
dust was harmless. One employee referred to Moore and 
Hundtofte as Jerks and liers. "Nothmg will ever change my mmd 
that they knew the 1mplicat10ns of this stuff," William A. Moyer 
Jr charged. "If I were to see one of those two guys agam, I 
wouldn't be responsible for my actions."74 Merh1ge could do 
little to directly aid the actual v1ct1ms of Kepone p01sonmg be-
cause personal compensation of InJUred parties must be ad-
dressed by civil smts, not by cnmmal fines. 75 Merh1ge was also 
aware that the acqmttal m the conspiracy tnal had placed Allied m 
a strong bargammg pos1t1on with respect to the civil litigation. 
Because of his ruling that the now defunct Life Science company 
was not m conspiracy with, nor a mere mstumentality of Allied, 
71. Gordon, supra note 19, at DI, col. I. 
72. Id. at col. 4. 
73. Spivey mterv1ew, supra note 21. 
74. Gordon, supra note 19, at DI, col. 4. 
75. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3556, the court may order the defendant to "make restitution to 
any victim of the offense m accordance with the prov1s1ons of sections 3663 and 3664. 
Section 3663(b) provides that the court may order return of property or damages m the 
case of an offense "resultmg m damage to or loss of or destruct10n of property of victim 
of the offense. Query: If Kepone contammatlon forced Chesapeake Bay fishermen out of 
busmess, were the fishermen "victims" and were their lost profits damages"? Can the 
sentencmg process be converted mto system for awarding compensation to v1ct1ms with-
out v1olatmg due process or eclipsmg the defendant' consutut1onal nght to JUTY tnal? 
See generally Note, The Unconst1tut1onality of the Victim and Witness Protection Act Under the Seventh 
Amendment, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1590 (1984). 
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there was little chance that the civil plaintiffs could recover dam-
ages from the Allied Corporation-the "deep pocket" in the civil 
cases. 
Merhige s insight as to potential civil liability proved accurate 
when over $200 million in personal injury smts were settled out 
of court for a mere $3 million. 76 Allied agreed to this modest 
settlement because it had learned from the criminal trial that even 
successful litigation could be more expensive than the costs of a 
settlement. An expensive public opimon poll had been financed 
by Allied in support of its motion for a change of venue, and over 
a thousand witnesses scattered throughout the country had been 
interviewed and deposed for the criminal trial. Even the briefest 
deposition can run twenty pages, while those taken from poten-
tially important witnesses can run several hundred pages. At that 
time, court reporters charged $60 per day to record testimony 
and an additional $1.75 for each page of testimony which was 
typed. 77 Such costs were considerable, but by far the largest ex 
penses were the lawyers fees, particularly in light of Allied's deci-
sion to employ a number of prestigious Richmond law firms. 
Fortune magazine characterized the Kepone litigauon as "the big-
gest windfall to hit Virginia s legal industry since personal-injury 
smts were invented."78 Murray J. Janus confirms that the legal 
fees were very substanual-"There were six lawyers and numer 
ous para-legals working full time on that case for a year " 79 In 
light of the costs of defending agamst the crimmal charges, set-
tling the civil smts for $3 million was a substantial victory for 
Allied. 
Allied's strmg of victories ended the day that Merhige imposed 
sentences for the nine hundred forty criminal pollution counts to 
which Allied had pleaded no-contest. Merhige grudgingly ac 
knowledged that Allied had generally been "a good corporate cit-
izen. " 80 He refused, however to be swayed by the company s 
argument that the dumpmg had been done innocently or madver 
tently Merhige imposed the maximum fine of $13.24 million m 
order to deter offenders everywhere. He announced his "hope 
after this sentence that every corporate official, every corporate 
76. Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at 02, col. 2. 
77 Eisman, supra note 47 at B4, col. 6. 
78. Zim, Allied Chemical's $20 Million Ordeal with Kepone, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978, at 88. 
79. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45. 
80. Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6. 
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employee that has any reason to thmk pollution 1s gomg on, will 
thmk, if I don't do somethmg about 1t now I am gomg to be out 
of a JOb tomorrow "81 
Legal second-guessers speculated that Allied should have 
sought an out-of-court settlement rather than expose Itself to 
Merh1ge s mercies. Janus admits, "we undervalued the case. This 
was the first case of this magmtude and nobody could assess 1t. 
Judge Merh1ge has a smcere belief m environmental protection, 
and I had to learn that the hard way Hell, when we were m prac 
uce together neither one of us could pronounce or spell environ-
mental law No one could back then."82 Janus was unaware that 
Merh1ge s environmental consc10usness had been raised dunng 
his vISits to Europe. While on his 1965 sabbatICal to Spam, Mer 
h1ge had been impressed with the lovely clear waters off the south 
of France. Five years later he returned to the spot to find the 
waters contammated with mdustnal pollution. Although Merh1ge 
mamtams that "I wasn t lookmg to pick on Allied or anyone else, 
I was very concerned with what was happenmg to our 
environment. " 83 
Allied did make a halfhearted attempt at negot1at1on, offenng 
to settle the cnmmal case for $2 million m fines. However Justice 
Department officials regarded the offer as a cocky take-it-or-leave 
1t proposal that left no room for additional negot1at1ons. Accord-
mg to Justice Department sources, the government had been pre-
pared to settle for about five or six million dollars.84 On the 
defense side, Janus mamtams that 1t was the Justice Department 
which failed to negotiate m good faith.85 Janus also expresses dis-
appomtment m Merh1ge s sentence. "Its the only time I've ever 
been upset w1thjudge Merh1ge," bemoans Janus. "Hes a consc1-
ent1ous judge who normally agomzes over sentencmg. But this 
ume I thmk he made up his mmd before he ever heard the evi-
dence m m1t1gat1on. We had obtamed a very favorable probation 
report whICh Judge Merh1ge brushed aside as a snow JOb we had 
done on the probation officer Thirteen million dollars was the 
largest fine ever imposed at that time, and I thmkjudge Merh1ge 
paid too much attention to his place m history " "On the other 
81. Id., see generally Richmond News Leader, Aug. 20, 1976 at Al col. I. 
82. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45. 
83. Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6. 
84. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45. 
85. Id. 
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hand," Janus admits, 'Judge Merhige did give us a falf shake on 
the conspiracy charge. His potential place m history didn't color 
his objectivity and he didn't hesitate one bit to enter an acqmttal 
when the ev1dence was msuffioent." "Still," Janus reflects, "I 
took the sentence personally because we worked so hard to show 
that Allied was a good corporate Citizen. Judge Merhige JUSt 
wouldn t listen. Hell, if he had knocked $100,000 off the maxi-
mum I could have at least felt that my hard work had saved Allied 
somethmg. ''86 
In typical fashion, Merhige handles the cnllcism with humor 
When mtroducmg Janus at a Bar function, Merhige announced: 
"I made Murray famous. I gave him a place m history by hittmg 
him with the largest cnmmal fine ever recorded. Although I'm 
not m the habit of explammg my decisions, I thmk you are enti-
tled to know why I imposed that fine. I fined your client $13.24 
million because the law would not permit me to fine them $13.24 
milliion and one dollar " 87 In a senous vem, Merh1ge explams 
that the Kepone mcident was "a smful thmg, because it was so 
mdiscnmmate m its mJury I get upset when a cnminal robs one 
citizen, but indiscnmmate cnmes like pollution or counterfeitmg 
keep Circulatmg and hurtmg more and more people. I believe m 
stiff penalties for such mdiscnmmate cnmes."88 
Although Merhige imposed the maximum penalty on Allied, he 
displayed his charactenstic creauvity m handling the case. Cnm1-
nal fines are normally deposited with the federal treasury but 
Merhige sought to return some of the money to the Citizens of 
Virgima who were the indirect victims of the poisoning of thelf 
environment. Merhige announced from the bench that he would 
"be mterested m any legal method to keep that money m Virgima 
to help the people directly mJured by Kepone. "89 Merhige s sug-
gestion proved to be the genesis of the Virgima Environmental 
Endowment. He imposed the maximum fine of $13.24 million, 
but reduced the fine to $5 million contmgent upon Allied's agree-
ment to establish an $8 million endowment to improve the envi-
ronment. Merhige s approach benefited the cillzens of Virgima 
and the Allied Corporat10n which was able to take a tax deduction 
on the contribuuon, thus reducing the net cost of the tnal's out-
86. Id. 
87 Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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come by $4 million. Neile Cotiaux, who won two national news 
awards for his coverage of the Kepone mcident, regards Mer 
htge s sentence as a stroke of gemus: "Creative law at Its best, for 
the benefit of the people."90 
The establishment of the eight million dollar Virgmia Environ-
ment Endowment may provide long range benefits for the State 
ofVirgmia, but Its immediate impact was to complicate resolut10n 
of the Kepone mcident. The State of Virgima filed smt agamst 
Allied for the damage done by Kepone and for the costs of 
cleanup projects. Costs which were projected to run as high as 
$15 million.91 The state demanded that Allied pay the full costs, 
while Allied msisted that the state government and the newly cre-
ated Environment Endowment Fund bear a portion of the costs. 
The Endowment, however took the position that no funds would 
be released until the state and Allied had reached a final settle 
ment on cleanup costs.92 Two years later the stalemate was finally 
broken when the state and Allied agreed that Allied would pay 
$5.25 million for Kepone related damages, while the state would 
accept a three year moratonum on its smts to recover the costs of 
the Kepone cleanup.93 This payment to the state brought to more 
than $20 million the amount that Allied had paid m connection 
with Kepone contammation. In addition to the $5.25 million set-
tlement with the state, Allied contributed $8 million to found the 
Virgima Environmental Endowment, paid $3 million in settle-
ments with former employees, and also had to pay the $5 million 
fine levied by Merhige. When legal expenses are added m, Ke-
pone connected damages are estimated to have cost Allied well 
over $30 million. 
90. Interview with Neile Cot1aux, fonner news reporter in Richmond, Virginia (May 14, 
1986). The propnety of corporate penance through judicially mandated chantable awards 
1s still being debated by the courts. See, e.g., Umted States v. Wnght Contracting Co., 728 
F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984) (reversing chantable contribution on govemment' appeal). U.S. 
attorneys often feel duty-bound to challenge such transfers from the government's coffers 
to the chanty s. In the Kepone case, however, the prosecutor offered only token resistance 
to Merh1ge creative sentencing. 
91. Eisman, Allied Volumes Point to Awareness by Pair Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 19, 
1977 at Cl, col. 4; Zim, supra note 78, at 90. 
92. Hoyle, Allied is to Pay State, Hopewell $5.2 Million, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 14, 
1977 at Al, col. 7 
93. Id. at Al, col. 4. 
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POST-SCRIPT 
Even when the financial costs are tallied, 1t 1s difficult to assess 
the final impact of the Kepone disaster The happiest part of the 
story 1s the extent to which the IIlJUred workers have been re 
turned to good health. Unlike most chemicals mtroduced mto 
the body Kepone tends to recycle Itself, slippmg out of the mtes-
tines to return to the liver and work its way through the system 
agam. In addition, the Medical College of Virgm1a discovered a 
drug which speeds the elimmat1on of bile aCids from the body 
and has been able to cut the average half-life of Kepone m the 
body from a hundred and sixty-five days to eighty days. As a re-
sult, all of the Life Science workers treated at the Medical College 
of Virgima have been virtually cured.94 The short run medical 
effects of Kepone have been elimmated, although the long range 
spectre of cancer still hangs over the v1cums. Kepone has pro-
duced cancer m laboratory ammals and its long run effect on 
humans 1s unknown.95 
The long run effect on the environment 1s also unclear Ke 
pone 1s extremely persistent once 1t enters the environment, and 
1s not easily broken down m nature. Some ten years after the last 
Kepone was made, fish and streams are still contammated above 
safety levels set by the Federal Govemment.96 Even though the 
Kepone level 1s droppmg, this does not mean that 1t 1s disappear 
mg. Dr Michael E. Bender of the Virgm1a Institute of Manne 
Science explamed that Kepone 1s an mcredibly stubborn chemi-
cal, and 1t 1s JUSt that the Kepone-laden sediments are bemg 
slowly buried by newer material settling on the river bottom.97 A 
maJor disturbance, such as a hurricane, could stir up the sedi-
ments and send the Kepone levels higher The Kepone threat re-
mams buried m river sediments, but dredgmg the river bottom 1s 
not a realistic soluuon. It could cost as much as $500 million to 
dredge the entire 200-square-mile area, and the dredging process 
might do more harm than good smce 1t would stir up the toxic 
chemICal. Kepone 1s likely to remam a problem m the Chesa-
peake Bay for decades. 
94. Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at D2, col. I. 
95. Gordon, supra note 19, at DI, col. 4. 
96. Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at D2, col. I. 
97 Id. at D2, col. I. 
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On the plus side, there has been dramatic improvement m the 
environment immediately surrounding the former Life Science 
plant m Hopewell. A new regional sewage treatment plant has 
deaned up Bailey s Creek and the James River where mdustnal 
wastes used to flow "You had to hold your nose when you went 
across Baileys Creek before," observed Hopewell Mayor Hilda 
M. Trama. "Now we have people down there fishmg."9 8 In the 
corporate sector Allied Chemical Corporation moved to tighten 
its control of manufactunng. The company adopted a new mcen-
t1ve-compensat1on program downgrading profitability as a mea-
sure of a manager s performance and givmg much greater weight 
to a regard for soCial and environmental responsibilities.99 Cor 
porate profits have also taken a back seat to Allied's concern for 
avmding further problems with Kepone. The Company paid a 
West German firm 25 cents a pound to bury its Kepone supplies, 
at a time when the European pnce for a Kepone-denved pesticide 
had soared to $55 a pound. Feanng future problems, Allied sim-
ply refused to sell any more Kepone. 100 
Perhaps the biggest gam from the Kepone disaster 1s the public 
awareness of workplace hazards. Today's workers are more likely 
to complam and to be heard by regulatory agencies. The director 
of safety standards for the federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Adm1mstrat1on recently observed that: "The Kepone mc1dent 
probably had the greatest impact on the agency of any disaster 
that occurred, m terms of puttmg the 'H' m OSHA. Before Ke-
pone, we were basICally a safety agency " 101 There 1s, however 
less than umversal praise for the federal government s height-
ened concern for employees welfare. Margaret Simmano, AFL 
CIO associate director for occupational safety and health, 
charged that the Reagan adm1mstrat10n was destroymg the regu-
latory process and turnmg back the clock to the pre-Kepone 
days.102 
Whatever has happened at the federal level, the State of Vir 
gm1a has taken strong steps to prevent another Kepone debacle. 
The State Bureau of Occupational Health has assumed sole re-
98. Id. at D2,col. 2. 
99. See Zim, supra note 78, at 91. 
100. Id. at 90. 
101. Gordon, Kepone Helped Bnng Passage of New Laws, Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 
9, 1985, at DI, col. 2. 
102. Id. 
316 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 12:291 
sponsibility for health mspectlons, and where there had previ-
ously been eleven mspectors, there are now thirty mdustnal 
hygiemsts and forty-two safety mspectors. 103 Many new laws and 
regulations have also been enacted to more closely momtor pollu-
tion. Faith m those new laws, however must be tempered with 
the pragmatism offered by Dr Robert B. Stroube, assistant com-
miss10ner of the Virgima Health Department. "The laws are m 
place to prevent another Kepone [incident], but there have been 
laws agamst murder for a long time, and people are still gettmg 
killed." 104 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at DI, col. I. 
